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Articles
Preserving Justice: A Discussion of
Rhode Island’s “Raise or Waive”
Doctrine
Nicholas Nybo*

“Preserving issues for appellate review is a fundamental
component of appellate practice.”1 “It is well established that ‘the
‘raise-or-waive rule’ precludes a litigant from arguing an issue on
appeal that has not been articulated at trial.’”2 The rule’s benefits
can hardly be denied: “Not only does the rule serve judicial
economy by encouraging resolution of issues at the trial level, it
also promotes fairer and more efficient trial proceedings by
providing opposing counsel with an opportunity to respond
appropriately to claims raised.”3 Furthermore, the raise or waive
* Associate, Donoghue Barrett & Singal, P.C.; former law clerk in the
Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New London. J.D., Roger
Williams University School of Law, 2013; B.B.A., Bryant University, 2010.
To Alyse, for patiently enduring many Saturday mornings marred by the
cacophonous combination of the keyboard and sports radio. A special thanks
to the editors of the Roger Williams Law Review for their efforts in reviewing
this Article. All errors and opinions (legitimate or otherwise) belong to the
author.
1. Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 564 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 2001) (quoting
JEAN H. TOAL ET AL., APPELLATE PRACTICE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 65 (1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2. State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201, 1212 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v.
Brown, 9 A.3d 1240, 1245 (R.I. 2010)).
3. State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987). Requiring arguments
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NYBOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/2015 12:22 PM

376 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:375
rule is one of appellate resource conservation, allowing courts to
limit the number of issues considered to those that have been
properly developed in the trial record. Nonetheless, there are
consequences that result from strict enforcement of the raise or
waive doctrine.
Strict adherence to the appellate preservation doctrine
prevents important issues from being decided, often punishing
parties (novices to the justice system) for their trial attorney’s
failure.4 “[T]his philosophy makes the availability of rights to
individual citizens dependent on the skills of a particular attorney
and the time that she has to devote to preparing for trial in any
case.”5 The cost-benefit analysis underlying raise or waive was
best discussed by Justice Hugo Black in 1941:
Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration
to issues not raised below. For our procedural scheme
contemplates that parties shall come to issue in the trial
forum vested with authority to determine questions of
fact. This is essential in order that parties may have the
opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant
to the issues which the trial tribunal is alone competent
to decide; it is equally essential in order that litigants
may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of
to be raised at the trial level allows the adverse party to make strategic
litigation decisions:
If the adverse party is aware of the objection the party can . . . urge
that the action not be taken, an alternative be adopted, or make as
complete a record as possible to support the action. If no objection is
made, the adverse party may think that the other party agrees with
the action or for tactical reasons decides not to raise an objection. In
either case the adverse party may fail to develop a record that would
support the action taken or forgo taking some step that would avoid
the alleged error.
Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule
and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (1987) (footnote omitted).
4.
The use of the word failure is not intended as a qualitative criticism
of trial attorneys who do not raise an issue at trial. To expect a trial attorney
to catch every arguably objectionable issue (and also articulate the precise
defect) would be patently unreasonable. An appellate attorney with the
opportunity to carefully read the record and consult relevant case law is
naturally in a far better position to identify and articulate potential error—
regardless of the respective quality and experience of the attorneys.
5. Gideon’s Trumpet, Gideon: Appellate Decisions Diminish Stature of
Judges, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2014.
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issues upon which they have had no opportunity to
introduce evidence. . . . There may always be exceptional
cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a
reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might
otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were
neither pressed nor passed upon by the court . . . Rules of
practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of
justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating
judicially declared practice under which courts of review
would invariably and under all circumstances decline to
consider all questions which had not previously been
specifically urged would be out of harmony with this
policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice
of the rules of fundamental justice.6
That same year, Roscoe Pound, celebrated legal commentator and
former dean of Harvard Law School, criticized an overly
restrictive approach to rules of appellate preservation.7 In
Pound’s opinion, “appellate review in America focused on a search
for error rather than a search for justice, which resulted in an
overemphasis on the content of the record.”8 In fact, the American
legal system would be without a number of its most revered
principles had the United States Supreme Court rigorously
adhered to the rule. The Court’s decisions in Mapp v. Ohio
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment),9 Washington v. Davis
(reevaluating the equal protection standard for racial
discrimination),10 and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (a choice of law
landmark)11 all suffered from various preservation defects.12
6.
7.

Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556–57 (1941).
See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1028 (citing ROSCOE POUND,
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 107–10 (1941)).
8. Id. (citing POUND, supra note 7, at 318–20).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12.
Specifically, those preservation defects have been catalogued as
such:
[S]ome of the Supreme Court’s most famous opinions decided issues
not presented by the briefs or addressed below. In Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, the Court overturned sua sponte an ancient precedent on
applying the common law in diversity cases. Mapp v. Ohio overrules
a prior case and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to
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Yet and still, the aforementioned benefits of raise or waive
have encouraged courts in every state to adopt some version of the
rule.13 Moreover, the rule enjoys particular importance in the
the states, without briefing or argument on the issue.
In
Washington v. Davis, the Court decided that Title VII standards did
not apply to constitutional discrimination, even though the parties
had agreed that they did. Younger v. Harris prohibits injunctions
against pending state court criminal cases, even though the issue
was not argued on appeal. Indeed, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Court
held that due process requires hearings and an opportunity to make
submissions before a state can terminate the parental rights of
unwed fathers. But the Court decided this without briefing or
argument—without a hearing on the issue or an opportunity for the
parties to make submissions.
Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings, When Courts Deprive
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1255–56
(2002) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
the Court reversed the petitioner’s disorderly conduct conviction based on a
speech he gave in Chicago on behalf of the Christian Veterans of America.
337 U.S. 1, 2 (1949). Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented as follows:
The impropriety of . . . the charge which is now made the basis of
reversal was not raised at the trial nor before the Appellate Court of
Illinois. . . . Thus an objection, not raised by counsel in the Illinois
courts, not made the basis of the petition for certiorari here—not
included in the “questions presented,” nor in the “reasons relied on
for the allowance of the writ”—and explicitly disavowed at the bar of
this Court, is used to upset a conviction which has been sustained by
three courts of Illinois.
Id. at 9 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Terminiello,
authored by Justice William O. Douglas, rejected the trial court’s jury
instruction broadly defining “breach of peace,” which the Court found violated
the First Amendment. Id. at 4–6 (majority opinion). As an interesting (albeit
exceedingly tangential) aside, Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent in the case
contains the only citation to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf that can currently be
found in the U.S. Reports. Id. at 23–24 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES & TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 328 (2010).
13. Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 546 (Ala. 2004) (Brown, J.,
dissenting); Still v. Cunningham, 94 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Alaska 2004); State v.
Tyszkiewicz, 104 P.3d 188, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Leach v. State, 402
S.W.3d 517, 528 (Ark. 2012); People v. Bonilla, 160 P.3d 84, 99–100 (Cal.
2007); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 831 (Colo.
1993); Bell Atl. Mobile Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 754 A.2d 128, 146–
47 (Conn. 2000); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 285 (Del. 2006); Hodges v.
State, 885 So. 2d 338, 358 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Smith v. State, 695 S.E.2d
679, 681 & n.3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Honolulu Univ. of Arts, 135 P.3d
113, 127 (Haw. 2006); Jones v. Crawforth, 205 P.3d 660, 668–69 (Idaho 2009);
People v. Kitch, 942 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ill. 2011); Ingram v. State, 718
N.E.2d 379, 382 n.5 (Ind. 1999); Duck Creek Tire Serv., Inc. v. Goodyear
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Ocean State. Between January 1, 2010 and January 1, 2014, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on the rule in refusing to
decide the merits of an issue in fifty-three cases.14 That number
Corners, 796 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Iowa 2011); State v. Bailey, 255 P.3d 19, 27
(Kan. 2011); Cain v. Lodestar Energy, 302 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Ky. 2009); State v.
Johnson, 860 So. 2d 180, 187–88 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Butler v. Killoran, 714
A.2d 129, 134 n.9 (Me. 1998); Hobby v. State, 83 A.3d 794, 802–03 (Md. 2014);
Commonwealth v. Bowler, 553 N.E.2d 534, 534 (Mass. 1990); Admire v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 831 N.W.2d 849, 851 n.5 (Mich. 2013); State v. Maurstad,
733 N.W.2d 141, 153 (Minn. 2007) (en banc) (Gildea, J., dissenting); Walker
v. State, 913 So. 2d 198, 217 (Miss. 2005) (en banc); Vance Bros. v. Obermiller
Constr. Serv., 181 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Mo. 2006); State v. Johnson, 265 P.3d
638, 642 (Mont. 2011); Paulsen v. State, 541 N.W.2d 636, 645 (Neb. 1996);
Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 623 P.2d 981, 983–84 (Nev. 1981); State v.
Brooks, 34 A.3d 643, 654 (N.H. 2011); State v. Robinson, 974 A.2d 1057, 1068
(N.J. 2009); Juneau v. Intel Corp., 127 P.3d 548, 552 (N.M. 2005); People v.
Cona, 399 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Chapman, 611 S.E.2d 794,
822–23 (N.C. 2005); Coughlin Const. Co., Inc. v. Nu-Tec Indus., Inc., 755
N.W.2d 867, 871 (N.D. 2008); State v. Peagler, 668 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio
1996); Miller v. State, 313 P.3d 934, 971 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013); Barcik v.
Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 781 n.12 (Or. 1995) (en banc); Harman ex. rel.
Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1124–25 (Pa. 2000); Martin v. Lawrence, 79
A.3d 1275, 1282 (R.I. 2013); Foster v. Foster, 711 S.E.2d 878, 880 (S.C. 2011);
State v. Wright, 768 N.W.2d 512, 534 (S.D. 2009); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d
438, 444 n.7 (Tenn. 2000); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602,
611 (Tex. 2012); Rapela v. Green, 289 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 2012); State v.
Sharrow, 949 A.2d 428, 436–37 (Vt. 2008); Lee v. Lee, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 &
n.1 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc); State v. McFarland, 899 P.2d 1251, 1255–
56 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); State v. Legg, 625 S.E.2d 281, 291 (W. Va. 2005);
State v. Rogers, 539 N.W.2d 897, 900–01 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Moore v.
Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 267 (Wyo. 1991).
14. Martin, 79 A.3d at 1282; State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795, 808 (R.I.
2013); Johnson v. QBAR Assocs., 78 A.3d 48, 54 (R.I. 2013); Greensleeves,
Inc. v. Smiley, 68 A.3d 425, 438–39 (R.I. 2013); State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454,
468–69 (R.I. 2013); State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1238, 1243 (R.I. 2013);
Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 & n.2 (R.I. 2013); State v. Price, 66
A.3d 406, 416–17 (R.I. 2013); State v. Botas, 71 A.3d 430, 434 (R.I. 2013);
Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1081 n.10, 1082–83 (R.I.
2013); Peloquin v. Haven Health Ctr. of Greenville, LLC, 61 A.3d 419, 430–31
(R.I. 2013); Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 288 n.13 (R.I.
2012); State v. Ford, 56 A.3d 463, 470 (R.I. 2012); Rodriguez v. Virgilio, 58
A.3d 914, 915 n.3 (R.I. 2012); State v. Bellem, 56 A.3d 432, 433 n.2 (R.I.
2012); State v. Tep, 56 A.3d 942, 945 n.10 (R.I. 2012); State v. Kluth, 46 A.3d
867, 875–76 (R.I. 2012); State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 83–84 (R.I. 2012);
McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 282 (R.I. 2012); State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272,
1279–80 (R.I. 2012); State v. Viveiros, 45 A.3d 1232, 1243–44 (R.I. 2012);
Iozzi v. Cranston, 52 A.3d 585, 590 (R.I. 2012); State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201,
1212–13 (R.I. 2012); Town Houses at Bonnet Shores Condo. Ass’n v. Langlois,
45 A.3d 577, 584 (R.I. 2012); State v. Alston, 47 A.3d 234, 242–43 (R.I. 2012);
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represents roughly ten percent of the total cases decided by the
court during that time. However, such reliance is certainly
justified. The state is one of only ten without an intermediate
appellate court,15 and its five appellate justices are tied with six
other states for least in the country.16 By way of local comparison,
Connecticut has seventeen appellate justices, one of which is on
senior status,17 while Massachusetts has thirty-one.18 Of course,
Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 1259–60 (R.I. 2012); Robideau v. Cosentino, 47
A.3d 338, 341 (R.I. 2012); Krivitsky v. Krivitsky, 43 A.3d 23, 32 (R.I. 2012);
State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 8–9 (R.I. 2012); State v. Vieira, 38 A.3d 18, 25 (R.I.
2012); State v. Lyons, 37 A.3d 118, 118 n.1 (R.I. 2012); State v. Delestre, 35
A.3d 886, 892 n.6 (R.I. 2012); In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273, 1280–81 (R.I.
2011); State v. Karngar, 29 A.3d 1232, 1235–36 (R.I. 2011); DeMarco v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 628–29 (R.I. 2011); Randall v. Randall, 22
A.3d 1166, 1172 (R.I. 2011); In re Quigley, 21 A.3d 393, 401 (R.I. 2011);
Dawkins v. Siwicki, 22 A.3d 1142, 1150 (R.I. 2011); State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d
302, 308–09 (R.I. 2011); State v. Kelly, 20 A.3d 655, 660–61 (R.I. 2011); State
v. Kizekai, 19 A.3d 583, 591 n.11 (R.I. 2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512,
524 (R.I. 2011); Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473–74 (R.I. 2011); State v.
Brown, 9 A.3d 1240, 1246 (R.I. 2010); State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 441 (R.I.
2010); State v. Storey, 8 A.3d 454, 465–66 (R.I. 2010); State v. Moreno, 996
A.2d 673, 684 (R.I. 2010); Vanderheiden v. Marandola, 994 A.2d 74, 78 (R.I.
2010); State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 1237 (R.I. 2010); In re Miguel A.,
990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010); State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 479 (R.I.
2010); Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. E. Providence, 989 A.2d 106, 109–10
(R.I. 2010); Classic Entm’t & Sports, Inc. v. Pemberton, 988 A.2d 847, 849 n.4
(R.I. 2010).
15. COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUDGES OF THE STATE COURTS OF APPEAL, THE ROLE
OF STATE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: PRINCIPLES FOR ADAPTING TO
CHANGE 2–3 & illus. 1 (2012), available at http://www.sji.gov/PDF/
Report_5_CCJSCA_Report.pdf.
16. The other six states with only five appellate justices are: Delaware,
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Judicial Officers of the Delaware Supreme Court, DEL. ST. CTS.,
http://courts.delaware.gov/Supreme/justices.stm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015);
Supreme Court – Meet the Justices, N.H. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.
courts.state.nh.us/supreme/justices.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); South
Dakota Supreme Court, S.D. UNIFIED JUD. SYS., http://ujs.sd.gov/
Supreme_Court/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Vermont Supreme
Court Justices’ Biographies, VT. JUDICIARY, https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/
GTC/Supreme/Justicesbios.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Justices & Staff,
W. VA. JUDICIARY, http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/justices-staff.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Wyoming Supreme Court, Meet the Justices, WYO.
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.wy.us/WSC (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
17.
Connecticut has eight supreme court justices and nine appellate
court judges. Connecticut Supreme Court Justices, ST. OF CONN. JUD.
BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/supjustices.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015); Connecticut Appellate Court Judges, ST. OF CONN. JUD.
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each additional justice results in an exponential increase in
judicial resources given that an appellate justice often enjoys at
least two law clerks as well as other research services. Finally, of
the ten states without an intermediate appellate court, Rhode
Island has the fourth highest population per appellate justice.19
In Rhode Island, there are 210,058 residents per appellate
justice.20 In a country where judicial resources are in short
supply, Rhode Island is paradigmatic.
In light of raise or waive’s competing interests, as well as the
rule’s continued prevalence in Rhode Island, a discussion of the
rule’s history and future is warranted. Part I of this Article will
revisit the historical development of both the rule and its narrow
exception in the state. Part II will discuss State v. Moten,21 a 2013
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision representing (in this
author’s humble opinion) an excessively restrictive approach to
the doctrine.
Finally, Part III will explore other possible
approaches to appellate preservation. The Article does not
advocate the abolition of the raise or waive doctrine. To allow the
talented appellate bar in Rhode Island to treat the trial record as
a first year torts exam, freely combing the transcript and spotting
issues for the court’s consideration, would wreak havoc on the
administration of appellate justice.
The Article will, however, seek clarification of the rule (and,
more specifically, its increasingly vague exception) to foster a
more crisp understanding of when the court will and will not

BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/appjudge.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015).
18. Massachusetts has seven justices on its Supreme Judicial Court and
twenty-four appeals court justices. Supreme Judicial Court Justices, MASS.
CRT. SYS., http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/sjc/about/sjc-justices/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2015); Appeals Court Justices, MASS. CRT. SYS., http://www.
mass.gov/courts/court-info/appealscourt/appeals-court-justices/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015).
19. Based on 2012 state population census estimates, Rhode Island has
210,058 residents per appellate justice while Nevada has 394,133 residents
per appellate justice, New Hampshire has 264,144 residents per appellate
justice, and West Virginia has 371,083 residents per appellate justice. 2012
State Population Census Estimates, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/
gov-data/state-census-population-migration-births-deaths-estimates.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
20. Id.
21. 64 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2013).
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consider the merits of an unpreserved, substantive argument.
Such clarification should allow appellants to voluntarily abandon
certain unpreserved arguments at an early stage, thus sparing
resources in researching and briefing the merits of that particular
argument. Of course, if the appellant abandons an issue, the
opposing party can ignore both the potential preservation defects
as well as the merits of the substantive argument—thereby
conserving its resources. And finally, if the argument is never
raised, the appellate court need not take time to justify its
decision whether to decide the merits. Ultimately, clarification
should yield efficiency returns at all levels of appellate practice.
I.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF “RAISE OR WAIVE”
AND ITS NARROW EXCEPTION

Rhode Island’s raise or waive rule experienced a fairly
unremarkable debut.22 The appeal in Denison v. Foster arose
from an action for trespass and ejectment.23 At trial, the court
granted the defendant’s motion for dismissal after the plaintiffs

22. The rule’s original conception, however, occurred overseas with
England’s writ of error procedure:
Under the writ of error review procedure the only issues that could
be presented to the appellate court were those that had been raised
and decided in the trial court. The entire purpose of the proceeding
was to test the correctness of the judge’s actions. The purpose was
not to test whether the proper party had won, but only whether the
judge had made an error. . . . [T]he appellate court could not rule on
any question not reflected in the record because the record was the
only way to determine the basis of the judge’s ruling. At the time,
the record consisted only of formal documents filed in court and the
official record of the actions of the jury and the judge. Because there
was no way to record verbatim what occurred at trial, a procedure
developed whereby a party could challenge a court’s action that
otherwise would not be reflected in the record . . . Under this
procedure, a party could ask the judge or a third party to record in
writing the action or inaction of the judge and the fact that the party
took exception to the judge’s ruling. This became known as the bill
of exceptions and was sent to the appellate court along with the
record. In effect, the bill of exceptions was the complaint against the
trial judge. Thus, a matter had to be presented to and ruled on by
the trial judge before the issue could be raised in the appellate court,
both because of the nature of the writ of error procedure and the
practicalities of recording the lower court proceeding.
Martineau, supra note 3, at 1026–27.
23. 31 A. 894, 894 (R.I. 1894).

NYBOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

PRESERVING JUSTICE

5/19/2015 12:22 PM

383

presented their testimony.24 The plaintiffs appealed arguing,
among other errors, that their right to a full and fair trial had
been violated because they were “forced to trial in a hasty and
discourteous manner, [and] that they were not prepared for
trial.”25 Late Rhode Island Supreme Court Chief Justice Pardon
E. Tillinghast responded that “[t]he statement of evidence
submitted with the papers in the case not having been presented
to or allowed by the justice presiding at the trial . . . forms no part
of the record, and we cannot, therefore, consider the same.”26
While the court stated that it would not consider the claim since it
had not been presented to the trial court, it also recognized that
the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to show any sufficient reason for not being
ready for trial” but merely relied on “bald assertions” and “general
statements.”27 The court denied and dismissed the petition for
new trial.28
In the subsequent 120 years, the rule has thusly evolved.
Appellate issues must be “preserved at trial by a specific objection,
sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice’s attention to the
basis for said objection.”29 Accordingly, “a litigant cannot raise an
objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised
before the trial court.”30 The court, nevertheless, “has declined to
lock the door in an unequivocal manner and has recognized the
existence of a narrow exception to the ‘axiomatic’ raise or waive
rule.”31 That exception applies when “basic constitutional rights
are concerned,” but “the alleged error must be more than
harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of
constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that
could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of

24. Id. at 894–95.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 895. At the time of the opinion, Justice Tillinghast was not the
Chief Justice; however, he would serve in that position from 1904 until his
death in 1905. See Chief Justice Tillinghast Expires of Pneumonia—His
Career, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 1905), available at http://query.nytimes.com/
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B0CE5D7163DE733A25753C1A9649C946497D6
CF.
27. Denison, 31 A. at 895.
28. Id.
29. State v. Warren, 624 A.2d 841, 842 (R.I. 1993).
30. State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008).
31. Pollard v. Acer Grp., 870 A.2d 429, 432 n.10 (R.I. 2005).

NYBOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/2015 12:22 PM

384 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:375
trial.”32
This narrow exception derives from two cases decided in 1965,
State v. Dufour and State v. Mendes.33 These appeals arose from
criminal trials that occurred before June 22, 1964, the day that
the United States Supreme Court decided Escobedo v. Illinois.34
In Escobedo—an extension of Gideon v. Wainwright35 and a
precursor to Miranda v. Arizona36—the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment required the police to inform a criminal defendant of
his right to counsel and his right to remain silent once the
investigation had matured from a “general inquiry” to an
investigation focused on the defendant.37
In Dufour, the
defendant was suspected of possessing pornographic films and
agreed to go to the police station and discuss the investigation
when confronted by police officers.38 During that discussion, the
defendant confessed that he was, in fact, the owner of the films.39
At no point did the defendant ask for counsel nor did the officers
advise the defendant of his right to counsel.40 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court recognized that the defendant had neither briefed
nor argued at oral argument that the confession was invalid.41
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the police had violated the
defendant’s rights under Escobedo, and the confession was
suppressed.42 Justice Joslin, in concurrence, emphasized that
“[w]hen we are satisfied that a defendant’s constitutional rights
have been violated in this manner in a criminal case, we are not
justified in sanctioning those violations because of the defendant’s
failure to observe procedural technicalities.”43
Five months later, the court decided State v. Mendes, an
32. State v. DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 660 n.6 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State
v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d
82 (R.I. 1965).
34. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
35. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
37. 378 U.S. at 490–91.
38. 206 A.2d at 83–84.
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 85. The defendant instead argued that his arrest was not
supported by probable cause. Id.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 88 (Joslin, J., concurring).
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appeal from a conviction for driving to endanger resulting in
death.44 After a night of drinking, the defendant struck the victim
with his vehicle and killed her.45 The defendant was taken into
custody, where tests revealed his level of intoxication, and he was
subsequently held overnight.46 The next morning, the defendant
was told that the victim had died, and during the subsequent
interrogation, the defendant made numerous incriminating
statements.47 Like in Dufour, the officers failed to advise the
defendant of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel.48 At
trial, the defendant’s statement was introduced into evidence, and
the defendant’s counsel conceded in open court that he had no
objection to the introduction of the statement.49 In fact, the
defense counsel used the statement to cross-examine the police
officers.50
The majority in Mendes, however, excused the
defendant’s failure to raise the objection at trial, “[b]ecause
defendant’s contentions have merit, we do not believe we should
compel him to seek post-conviction relief . . . The defendant has
been denied due process and the conviction cannot stand.”51 The
majority determined that the defendant’s statement violated the
principles in Escobedo and remanded the case to the superior
court for retrial.52
Justice Joslin dissented in Mendes because, among other
reasons, he felt that the defense counsel had waived the issue on
appeal given that counsel (unlike the defense counsel in Dufour)
had intentionally refused to object to the introduction of the
statement.53 “As part of his trial tactics, deliberately adopted,
[defense counsel] intentionally bypassed [the contemporaneous
objection] requirement. By that conduct defendant forfeited his
right to assert on review that the admission of the statement

44. State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50, 52 (R.I. 1965).
45. Id. at 53.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 54.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 57–58 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 56 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82, 88
(R.I. 1965) (Joslin, J., concurring)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 57–58 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
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violated his federal constitutional rights.”54 Justice Joslin further
emphasized the importance of defense counsel’s intentional use of
the statement:
I add, however, to what I have said that my opinion
would
be
otherwise
if
the
requirement
of
contemporaneous objection were a procedural technicality
having no rational relationship to a well ordered trial. If
such were the case, I would not insist, nor would I have
any right to on compliance at the expense of ignoring a
defendant’s constitutional rights. . . . When such a
procedure is intentionally disregarded by competent trial
counsel, in my judgment the constitutional right, which
might have been brought into issue by compliance, is
waived.55
The exception for novel constitutional issues has developed since
1965; however, appellants who have claimed the exception over
the years have not enjoyed much success. In the past twenty-five
years, the court has rejected litigants’ attempts to satisfy the
exception in at least fifty-seven cases.56 A most recent example
54. Id. at 58.
55. Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
56. State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1241 (R.I. 2013); State v. Kluth, 46
A.3d 867, 876 n.14 (R.I. 2012); State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 83–84 (R.I. 2012);
State v. Alston, 47 A.3d 234, 243 n.16 (R.I. 2012); State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d
1283, 1289 n.7 (R.I. 2011); State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 308 n.13 (R.I. 2011);
Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2011); State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1240,
1246 (R.I. 2010); In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010); State v.
DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 660 n.6 (R.I. 2009); State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228,
236 n.16 (R.I. 2008); State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 312 (R.I. 2008); State v.
Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829–30 (R.I. 2008); State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 841
(R.I. 2008); State v. Young, 941 A.2d 124, 128 (R.I. 2008); State v. Ramirez,
936 A.2d 1254, 1262 (R.I. 2007); Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 428
(R.I. 2007); State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 647 (R.I. 2006); State v. Gomes,
881 A.2d 97, 113 n.27 (R.I. 2005); Lyons v. State, 880 A.2d 839, 841 n.4 (R.I.
2005); State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1126 n.15 (R.I. 2005); State v.
Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 810 (R.I. 2005); State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992,
1018 (R.I. 2005); State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 936 n.7 (R.I. 2005); Pollard v.
Acer Grp., 870 A.2d 429, 432 n.10 (R.I. 2005); State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787,
797 (R.I. 2004); In re Ephraim L., 862 A.2d 196, 201 (R.I. 2004); State v.
Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1040 (R.I. 2004); Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1122
(R.I. 2004); State v. Portes, 840 A.2d 1131, 1141–42 (R.I. 2004); State v.
Rivera, 839 A.2d 497, 501 n.5 (R.I. 2003); State v. Silva, 798 A.2d 419, 428
(R.I. 2002); State v. Kaba, 798 A.2d 383, 388 (R.I. 2002); Roe v. Gelineau, 794
A.2d 476, 482 (R.I. 2002); Harvey Realty v. Killingly Manor Condo. Ass’n, 787
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was the court’s decision in State v. Moten.57
II. STATE V. MOTEN & THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT

Rigorous adherence to the rules of appellate preservation is
particularly justified for certain substantive issues. Evidentiary
rulings, for example, often invoke principles (such as conditional
relevance and undue prejudice) that are intrinsically intertwined
with and must be evaluated in the context of the trial. In a
vacuum—without the benefit of counsels’ arguments and the trial
court’s ruling on those arguments—it would be difficult for
appellate justices to review an evidentiary issue with only the
benefit of the “cold record.”58 From January 1, 2010 to January 1,
2014, of the fifty-three cases wherein the court denied review of an
issue pursuant to raise or waive, about one third (sixteen cases)
involved evidentiary issues.59 Moreover, Rule 30 of the Superior
A.2d 465, 467 (R.I. 2001); State v. Hazard, 785 A.2d 1111, 1116 (R.I. 2001);
Cronan ex. rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 878 (R.I. 2001); State v. Breen,
767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001); State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 390 n.16 (R.I.
2001); State v. Rieger, 763 A.2d 997, 1004 (R.I. 2001); State v. Addison, 748
A.2d 814, 820 n.1 (R.I. 2000); In re David G., 741 A.2d 863, 866 (R.I. 1999);
State v. Brezinski, 731 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 1999); State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d
430, 437 (R.I. 1998); State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 479 (R.I. 1998); State v.
Rivera, 706 A.2d 914, 920 (R.I. 1997); State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I.
1997); State v. Leonardo, 677 A.2d 1336, 1337 (R.I. 1996); State v. Figueroa,
673 A.2d 1084, 1092 (R.I. 1996); State v. Grabowski, 672 A.2d 879, 882 (R.I.
1996); State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 446 (R.I. 1996); State v. Thomas,
654 A.2d 327, 332 (R.I. 1995); State v. Froais, 653 A.2d 735, 739 (R.I. 1995);
State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015–16 (R.I. 1994); State v. Cardoza, 649
A.2d 745, 748 (R.I. 1994); State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993);
State v. Donato, 592 A.2d 140, 142 (R.I 1991).
57. 64 A.3d at 1241.
58. The court has most often used the “cold record” language in the
context of reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. See,
e.g., State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795, 804 (R.I. 2013); State v. Erminelli, 991
A.2d 1064, 1069 (R.I. 2010).
It is well-established that we accord a great deal of respect to the
factual determinations and credibility assessments made by the
judicial officer who has actually observed the human drama that is
part and parcel of every trial and who has had an opportunity to
appraise witness demeanor and to take into account other realities
that cannot be grasped from a reading of a cold record.
Erminelli, 991 A.2d at 1069 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d 235, 242
(R.I. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This logic can also apply to
evidentiary rulings based on relevance, prejudice, or bias.
59. Martin v. Lawrence, 79 A.3d 1275, 1282 (R.I. 2013); State v. Pona, 66
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Court Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically mandates the
preservation of objections to jury instructions.60 During the above
stated time period, the court denied review of unpreserved
arguments related to jury instructions in five cases.61
Nevertheless, there remain thirty-two other cases where the court
rejected a wide variety of issues including criminal joinder,62
adequacy of tax sale notice,63 and the removal of probate funds.64
Certainly, the court properly invoked raise or waive in the great
majority of these cases; however at least one warrants further
discussion.
In May of 2013, the Rhode Island Supreme Court released its
opinion in State v. Moten, affirming the appellant’s first-degree
child abuse conviction.65 The sole issue on appeal involved the
testimony of Dr. Nancy Harper, a pediatrician who examined the
child’s injuries.66 During the doctor’s testimony, she was asked
about statements made to her by a colleague (an ophthalmologist)
who had examined the child’s eyes.67 The defense counsel
objected, and the trial justice sustained the objection.68 The
prosecutor then asked Dr. Harper whether the ophthalmologist’s

A.3d 454, 469 (R.I. 2013); State v. Ford, 56 A.3d 463, 470 (R.I. 2012); State v.
Bellem, 56 A.3d 432, 433 n.2 (R.I. 2012); State v. Tep, 56 A.3d 942, 945 n.10
(R.I. 2012); State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272, 1280 (R.I. 2012); State v. Ciresi, 45
A.3d 1201, 1212–13 (R.I. 2012); Alston, 47 A.3d at 243; Robideau v.
Cosentino, 47 A.3d 338, 341 (R.I. 2012); In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273, 1280–
81 (R.I. 2011); State v. Kelly, 20 A.3d 655, 660–61 (R.I. 2011); Brown, 9 A.3d
at 1246; State v. Moreno, 996 A.2d 673, 684 (R.I. 2010); State v. McManus,
990 A.2d 1229, 1237 (R.I. 2010); In re Miguel, 990 A.2d at 1223; State v.
Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 479 (R.I. 2010).
60. Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides,
in relevant part: “No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission therefrom unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects
and the grounds of the party’s objection.” R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 30.
61. Whitaker, 79 A.3d at 808; State v. Botas, 71 A.3d 430, 434 (R.I.
2013); State v. Viveiros, 45 A.3d 1232, 1243–44 (R.I. 2012); State v. Delestre,
35 A.3d 886, 892 n.6 (R.I. 2012); Dawkins v. Siwicki, 22 A.3d 1142, 1150 (R.I.
2011).
62. State v. Kluth, 46 A.3d 867, 875–76 (2012).
63. Johnson v. QBAR Assocs., 78 A.3d 48, 54 (2013).
64. Randall v. Randall, 22 A.3d 1166, 1172 (2011).
65. 64 A.3d 1232, 1234 (R.I. 2013).
66. Id. at 1235.
67. Id. at 1236–37.
68. Id. at 1236.
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statements were necessary for Dr. Harper’s complete assessment
of the child, and the doctor answered in the affirmative.69 The
prosecutor asked again about the ophthalmologist’s statements,
and the defense counsel again objected; however the trial justice
overruled the objection.70
Dr. Harper testified about the
ophthalmologist’s statements regarding the extensive injuries
suffered by the child.71 The defendant was convicted of firstdegree child abuse and given a twenty-year prison sentence.72
On appeal, the defendant’s only argument was that Dr.
Harper’s testimony violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause.73 While the trial counsel did repeatedly object to Dr.
Harper’s testimony, counsel never specifically referenced the
Confrontation Clause.74
Justice Robinson, writing for the
majority, began by emphasizing that the court’s raise or waive
rule “is not some sort of artificial or arbitrary Kafkaesque hurdle.
Instead, the rule serves as an important guarantor of fairness and
efficiency in the judicial process.”75 The majority proceeded to
recognize that the trial counsel had made a general objection to
Dr. Harper’s testimony, but had not articulated the specific basis
for that objection.76 The defendant maintained that it was clear
that the trial counsel’s objection was based on the Confrontation
Clause; however, the majority disagreed: “In our view . . . it is
equally—if not more—plausible that the prosecutor and the trial
justice understood defendant’s objection to be on hearsay
69. Id. at 1236–37.
70. Id. at 1237. That exchange proceeded as follows:
Q: And did you need [the ophthalmologist’s statements] to further
your information for the treatment of [the child], as well as the
diagnosis?
A: Yes.
Q: And what did he tell you.
DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1239.
75. Id. at 1238 (quoting DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 628
n.55 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 1239.
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grounds.”77 In support of this conclusion, Justice Robinson cited
an earlier objection levied by defense counsel to the introduction of
similar out of court statements made by an emergency room
technician.78 In that instance, there was a sidebar during which
the attorneys and trial justice discussed Rule 803(4) of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence, which creates a hearsay exception for
out of court statements made for the purposes of medical
treatment.79
The majority relied upon this and other
circumstantial evidence of the trial counsel’s intent to propound a
hearsay objection to Harper’s testimony and declined to further
embark upon a “journey into the mind of defense counsel, the
prosecutor, or the trial justice,” which the court characterized as
“a fruitless effort that brings to the fore the very purpose of the
‘raise or waive’ rule.”80 The court then moved on to discuss the
narrow exception for novel constitutional issues.81
The majority began its discussion of the exception by warning
that “the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the
exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension
derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have
been known to counsel at the time of trial.”82 The defendant’s
argument focused on the reformulated Confrontation Clause
analysis first announced in Crawford v. Washington, decided on
March 8, 2004.83 In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court,
abandoning the framework established in Ohio v. Roberts,84 stated
that the admission of an out of court, “testimonial” statement
violates the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause unless the
declarant is determined to be “unavailable” and the defendant had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.85
While the defendant did not specifically rely on Crawford, the
majority stated that such reliance would have been frivolous given
that the decision was published more than two and a half years
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1240.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
84. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
85. Moten, 64 A.3d at 1241 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).
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before Dr. Harper’s testimony at trial.86 The defendant instead
relied upon two more recent United States Supreme Court
decisions in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts87 and Bullcoming v.
New Mexico,88 which, the defendant argued, constituted
“intervening decisions” establishing a novel constitutional rule.89
The majority rejected the argument: “Both Bullcoming and
Melendez-Diaz merely apply the rule announced in Crawford.
Therefore, those cases cannot be considered to have established a
‘novel constitutional rule.’”90
The defendant desperately
attempted to avoid the dreaded result by arguing that MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming had extended the rule in Crawford from
mere witness statements to neutral, scientific evidence that had
not previously been considered to violate the Confrontation
Clause.91 The testimonial statements in Crawford were made by
the victim to the police, whereas the testimonial statements in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming consisted of lab results.92 The
defendant asserted that the ophthalmologist’s statements were
neutral, scientific evidence covered by Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, both decided after the defendant’s trial.93 Justice
Robinson remained unconvinced:
The “narrow exception” to the “raise or waive” rule
applies to novel constitutional rules. It is not available
when the Supreme Court applies a familiar constitutional
rule to a novel fact pattern. If that were the standard,
then virtually every constitutional decision of the
Supreme Court would provide defendants an opportunity
to take advantage of the exception. There would be
nothing “narrow” about such an outcome, nor would that
outcome further the rule’s purpose of “fairness and
efficiency in the judicial process.”94

86. Id.
87. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
88. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
89. Moten, 64 A.3d at 1241.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1242.
92. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004), with
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307, and Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712.
93. Moten, 64 A.3d at 1242.
94. Id. at 1243.
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With that, the majority affirmed the defendant’s conviction.95
“Hindsight is always twenty-twenty—especially when
afforded the benefit of almost seven years of clarifying United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence.”96
Thus began the
dissenting opinion in Moten authored by Justices Flaherty and
Indeglia. The two justices began by concurring with the majority’s
affirmance of the conviction—given that the ophthalmologist’s
statements were not testimonial—yet expressed concern over the
majority’s narrowing of the raise or waive exception.97 The
dissent emphasized the United States Supreme Court’s disclaimer
in Crawford: “[W]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”98
The dissent
continued to stress the ongoing development in this area of
criminal procedure:
It was not until approximately three-and-one-half years
after Moten’s trial, which took place in 2006, that the
United States Supreme Court moved beyond the realm of
interrogation and considered whether forensic analyses—
statements much more akin to the ophthalmologist’s outof-court statements made to Dr. Harper—were
testimonial in nature and, thus, subject to exclusion
under the Confrontation Clause.99
Justices Flaherty and Indeglia disputed the majority’s
assertion that Melendez-Diaz was a mere application of Crawford,
recognizing that the scope of the Confrontation Clause remained
unsettled and vigorously debated in the wake of Crawford.100
The dissent moved on to cite Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
concerns that the Crawford approach exhibited “persistent
ambiguities” which were “symptomatic of a rule not amenable to
sensible applications.”101 This ambiguity had been exacerbated by
95. Id.
96. Id. (Flaherty, J. and Indeglia, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in result).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1244 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68
(2004)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 923 N.E.2d 524, 532 (Mass.
2010)).
101. Id. at 1245 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2726
(2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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the fact that, prior to Moten’s trial, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had provided sparse clarification of Crawford.102 Justices
Flaherty and Indeglia concluded with the following:
Although it cannot reasonably be disputed that the
exception to our “raise or waive” rule is indeed a narrow
one, we maintain that the majority effectively reads this
exception out of our jurisprudence. The line between a
novel rule of law and the application of a rule of law in a
new context can sometimes be blurry, if not
indistinguishable. We acknowledge that this is a close
call, but we cannot fault defense counsel for his failure to
forecast Crawford’s application to the facts.103
The dissent then moved on to explain why the ophthalmologist’s
statements in this case were not testimonial.104
While the majority in Moten was particularly stringent in its
interpretation of the novel constitutional issue exception, such
rigidity has not always been the standard. In State v. Dennis, the
appellant levied a due process challenge against Rhode Island
General Laws section 11-37.1-15(a)(2), which allows the superior
courts to determine the extent of witness production and cross
examination necessary before a person is classified as a sex
offender.105 The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that
the appellant had failed to raise the procedural due process
objection to the statute at the superior court level, but chose to
review the claim anyway.106 “Although we remain unconvinced
that the right to procedural due process in the Superior Court
amounts to a novel rule of constitutional law . . . we shall
nonetheless address defendant’s claims.”107 It remains entirely
unclear why the court—composed of the same five justices that
decided Moten—agreed to rule on the merits of the appellant’s
procedural due process claim in Dennis. As the court recognized,
the principles underlying procedural due process rights were far
from novel—having been established by the United States
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1246–48.
29 A.3d 445, 449 (R.I. 2011).
Id. at 449–50.
Id. at 450.
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Supreme Court in the 1970s.108 More importantly, the court had
ruled, nearly two years earlier, on the extent to which procedural
due process applies to section 11-37.1-15(a)(2).109 Accordingly,
unlike in Moten, there was hardly an interstice in this area of
Rhode Island’s constitutional jurisprudence.110
An examination of the majority opinion in Moten (especially
when juxtaposed with Dennis) reveals the subjective,
unpredictable nature of Rhode Island’s raise or waive rule and,
more specifically, its exception.
As the dissent in Moten
recognized, the distinction between a truly novel rule and the
mere application of an existing rule to new facts is tenuous at
best.111 Was the United States Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in
United States v. Jones—concluding that GPS tracking constitutes
a search—a novel rule or an application of existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to a new set of facts?112 Was Roe v.
Wade a novel constitutional rule113 or simply a new application of

108. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
109. State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 578 (R.I. 2009).
110. Compounding this confusion are the cases where the court has
concluded that an issue was waived and yet proceeded to decide the merits
anyway. In State v. Figuereo, for example, the defendant argued that the
trial justice committed reversible error by declining to give a certain jury
instruction regarding eyewitness reliability. 31 A.3d 1283, 1288 (R.I. 2011).
The court began by reciting its raise or waive rule, explaining that the
defendant had not requested the particular instruction which she now
claimed was required, and therefore, she had waived her right to argue in
favor of said instruction. Id. at 1289–90. Nonetheless, the court chose to rule
on the merits of the defendant’s argument, ultimately rejecting the claim. Id.
at 1290–91. Furthermore, in State v. Delarosa, the court ruled on the merits
of the defendant’s “right to allocution” argument despite observing that the
defendant “may have waived the issue of his right to allocution because he
did not indicate to the hearing justice that he wished to address the court.”
39 A.3d 1043, 1052 n.17 (R.I. 2012). These are cases where the court seemed
to be bolstering its substantive decision by emphasizing that, even if one
disagrees with its decision on the merits, the appellants’ arguments should be
rejected because they were waived. While the court is certainly permitted to
provide alternative bases for a ruling, the virtue of judicial efficiency—so
often cited to justify the harsh realities of the raise or waive doctrine—is
impeded when the court decides to rule on the merits despite waiver of the
argument.
111. See State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1245 (R.I. 2013) (Flaherty, J. and
Indeglia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result).
112. 132 S. Ct. 945, 952–54 (2012).
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the right to privacy that the Court had discovered eight years
earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut?114 In a legal system predicated
on the incremental extension of existing jurisprudence, divining
the precise moment of conception for a particular constitutional
principle is a difficult proposition.
Additionally, even if a constitutional principle can be
classified as truly novel, what is the statute of limitations on
novelty? The majority in Moten determined that Crawford’s
novelty had expired after two and a half years.115
That
determination seems eminently reasonable; however, at what
point in those two and a half years did the novelty actually expire?
After the first year? After the second year? Moving forward, how
do appellate litigators determine whether too much time has
passed between the novel case and the underlying trial? At some
point, it probably becomes easier to simply require that the novel
case actually intervene the trial and appeal as occurred in State v.
Mendes and State v. Dufour.116 Simply put, the novelty standard
results in a situation where both advocates as well as the court
must expend significant resources while attempting to determine
whether the appeal presents a novel issue or merely a novel
application. This, of course, occurs before any consideration of the
underlying substantive question is addressed.117 All of this is in
service of a rule which purportedly advances the efficient
administration of justice.
One final concern with the ambiguous exception is the conflict
that can arise between the attorney’s duty to their client and the
attorney’s duty of candor to the court. In reviewing trial
transcripts for error, appellate counsel will inevitably be
confronted with potential preservation issues—whether the trial
counsel failed to object at all or merely failed to articulate the
proper basis for the objection (as was the case in Moten118).
114. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
115. Moten, 64 A.3d at 1241.
116. See State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50, 52–53 (R.I. 1965); State v. Dufour,
206 A.2d 82, 83, 85, 87 (R.I. 1965).
117. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1032 (“Each time an appellant asks
the appellate court to consider an issue not raised in the trial court, the
appellate court must devote time to deciding whether to consider the issue
and, if it decides to do so, must then spend additional time examining its
merits.”).
118. Moten, 64 A.3d 1239.

NYBOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/2015 12:22 PM

396 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:375
Arguably, affirmatively raising the defect in the topside brief is
not in the appellant’s best interest. However, Rule 3.3 of the
Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct demands an
attorney’s candor to the tribunal. More specifically Rule 3.3(a)(2)
states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to
the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client
and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”119 “The underlying
concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to
determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.”120
In light of this conflict, many attorneys may endeavor to
shoehorn an unpreserved argument into the novel constitutional
rule exception, thereby justifying his or her choice not to
affirmatively alert the court of the procedural defect. The more
ambiguous the exception, the more preservation defects counsel
can, in good faith, justify not raising. Certainly, the odds are low
that such defects escape opposing counsel, the justices, and their
law clerks; however, a good faith argument that the exception
applied should spare the attorney from rebuke.121 While it may
119. R.I. R. Prof. Conduct R. 3.3(a)(2).
120. Id. R. 3.3, cmt. 3.
121. The tension created between the appellate attorney’s duty to the
client and his duty to the court with regards to preservation issues is far from
conjecture:
Both [appellants] now complain that the eventual admission of
the handguns into evidence violated the order excluding evidence not
provided pursuant to discovery orders. Indeed, both claim that this
issue is preserved by the trial court’s ruling on that motion.
It is very clear that after this Court’s review of the record that
the motion to exclude evidence not provided pursuant to discovery
orders was not aimed at the handguns; more importantly, it is clear
that the trial court’s order granting this motion did not cover that
evidence. That this could not be clearer is shown by the facts that a
separate motion specifically addressed the handguns, that this
motion was discussed just a moment before the discovery-order
motion, and that the court separately ruled on this motion. In
presenting their arguments as they have and ignoring the separate
motions made at trial, it seems that appellate counsel either did not
review the record very carefully or they have decided to push the
boundaries of the duty of candor to a tribunal to its limits. [One of
the two attorneys] at least, appears to have recognized that there
were two different motions and rulings, but she argues that the trial
court’s rulings were inconsistent and arbitrary. Because the motion
to exclude evidence not provided under the discovery orders and the
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be strategically beneficial for the attorney to raise the defect in the
topside brief in an attempt to “take the sting out,”122 waiting to
address the defect in the reply brief (assuming the opposing side
identifies it) can be equally tempting. Ultimately, this is an
internal strategic debate that the law should aspire to
eliminate.123 Both the advocates who rely upon the rule as well as
the judges who must administer it would benefit from additional,
objective guideposts for determining whether an unpreserved
issue should be considered.
III. THE FUTURE OF RAISE OR WAIVE

Rhode Island’s raise or waive rule is neither a statutory
mandate nor a constitutional imperative; it is a prudential
limitation imposed on the court by the court. Unlike personal
jurisdiction or a statute of limitations, the court could abandon the
doctrine (or its exception) tomorrow. In that sense, raise or waive
court’s resolution of this motion did not cover the guns, they cannot
be deemed to have preserved this issue for appellate review.
Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 88 (Ky. 2012) (second emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
122.
There are certainly benefits of affirmatively raising preservation
defects for appellate courts. See, e.g., Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390
S.W.2d 558, 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (“Defendant, although admitting with
commendable candor that it has not preserved any allegation of error as to
Instruction No. 7, insists that this court should consider its allegation . . . as
constituting ‘plain error.’”); State v. Reid, 367 S.E.2d 672, 674 (N.C. 1988)
(“[T]he defendant conceded with commendable candor that the objection at
trial came too late and that this question was not properly preserved for
appellate review.”). However, such benefits rarely extend beyond mere
compliment. See, e.g., Landie, 390 S.W.2d at 568 (“[T]his is not a case
wherein this court should exercise its discretion under [the plain error
exception].”); Reid, 367 S.E.2d at 674 (“[W]e decline the defendant’s invitation
to suspend the rules of appellate procedure.”).
123. There are other strategic reasons why an attorney may raise an
issue despite its obvious preservation defects. The doctrine of cumulative
error, for instance, recognizes that “at some point trial errors may combine so
that together they operate to infect the trial fundamentally and thus violate
the defendant’s due process rights.” State v. Powers, 566 A.2d 1298, 1305
(R.I. 1989). The doctrine, first discussed in State v. Pepper, 237 A.2d 330 (R.I.
1968), states that “[w]hile an error may not be prejudicial when examined in
isolation, a series of errors may have a cumulative effect which supports
reversal.” State v. Roderick, 403 A.2d 1090, 1093 n.4 (R.I. 1979). This
appellate “Hail Mary” requires, as one might imagine, a substantial number
of errors, and accordingly, an attorney relying on the doctrine may want to
raise an unpreserved issue in an attempt to increase the aggregate.
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is analogous to stare decisis. Both are self-imposed restraints on
the court’s clear authority to decide a legal issue.124 Both are
historically rooted in the predictability of the law and the efficient
administration of justice.125 However, with regards to stare
decisis, the United States Supreme Court has candidly provided
litigants and judges with particularized circumstances where the
court may depart from the doctrine.126 Yet, in the realm of raise
or waive, litigants have been left to struggle with the meaning of a
“novel constitutional rule.”
In 1982, the First Circuit decided United States v. Krynicki.127
In Krynicki, the district court dismissed stolen gun charges under
the Speedy Trial Act given that the indictment was returned more
than thirty days after the defendant’s arrest.128 The government
appealed and argued that, because the indictment charged the
defendant with counts additional to those for which she was
originally arrested, the additional counts should not have been
dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act.129 The defendant rebutted
that the government had not presented that argument to the
district court on the motion to dismiss.130 Given that there was no
transcript of the district court hearing, the First Circuit assumed
that the government had indeed failed to raise the argument at
124. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is
not an inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’” (quoting Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
125. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 312 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting)
(“While the doctrine of stare decisis does not absolutely bind the Court to its
prior opinions, a decent regard for the orderly development of the law and the
administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases be either
followed or candidly overruled.”).
126. In Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor recognized that, in deciding whether to abandon stare decisis, a
court should consider: (1) whether the rule at issue has historically defied
practical workability; (2) whether the rule has been detrimentally relied upon
in a manner that removing it would result in inequitable circumstances; (3)
whether related principles of law have developed in a manner to render the
original rule “no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; and (4)
whether the facts surrounding the rule have so changed “as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification.” 505 U.S. 833, 854–55
(1992).
127. 689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982).
128. Id. at 290–91.
129. Id. at 291.
130. Id.
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the district court level.131
The three judge panel, consisting of Judges Levin Campbell,
Stephen Breyer, and Raymond Pettine (sitting by designation),
began by reiterating that “[t]he ordinary rule is that appellate
courts will not consider issues not raised below. . . . However,
appellate courts do have discretion to examine issues raised for
the first time on appeal.”132 The court identified four principles
for determining whether an unpreserved issue falls within this
exception: (1) whether the unpreserved issue is purely legal and
no further development of the factual record is necessary to its
resolution; (2) whether the party’s argument is “highly
persuasive”; (3) whether the issue is almost certain to arise in
future cases, and therefore, declining to decide the matter will
hinder judicial economy and the fair administration of criminal
justice; and (4) whether declining to reach the issue would
constitute “a miscarriage of justice.”133 The court concluded that
the government’s argument satisfied these principles and decided
the issue on the merits, ultimately agreeing with the government
and reversing the district court’s dismissal.134 The First Circuit
has subsequently used the principles of Krynicki on multiple
occasions to justify ruling on unpreserved arguments.135
While the second and fourth principles set out in Krynicki are
admittedly no more concrete than the Rhode Island Supreme
Court’s current jurisprudence, the first and third principles are
objective, sensible criteria which would give appellate advocates
more guidance as to whether an unpreserved argument will be
heard on the merits.
One of the primary concerns underlying the raise or waive
rule is that an appellate court’s knowledge of the case is strictly
limited to the trial record.136 Continually remanding matters to
the trial courts for further factual findings on unpreserved issues
would be an enormously unwieldy procedure.
Accordingly,

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 291–92.
134. Id. at 295.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick V., 359 F.3d 3, 8 & n.2 (1st Cir.
2004); Castillo v. Matesanz, 348 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1012–13 (1st Cir. 1990).
136. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1038.
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Krynicki’s first criterion—requiring that the unpreserved issue be
purely legal with no further factual development required—is a
logical limitation on the exception to raise or waive.137 Appellate
consideration of such unpreserved, purely legal issues does not
deprive the opposing party “of an opportunity to introduce
relevant evidence.”138
Yet and still, whether appellate courts are equipped to
determine if additional evidence is necessary to resolve an
unpreserved, legal issue has been questioned.139 To some, the
suggestion that “an appellate court can look at the record and
conclude that no additional, relevant evidence could have been
introduced on a completely new legal issue had the parties known
it would be decisive in the case simply flies in the face of what we
know about the trial process.”140 For example, one wonders
whether Moten would have met this criterion. While the dissent
felt confident in deciding that the ophthalmologist’s statements
were not testimonial based on the existing record,141 certainly
additional evidence regarding the precise purpose for the
statements as well as the reason why the ophthalmologist was
unavailable would have been helpful. On the other hand, analysis
under Krynicki’s first criterion would be very similar to
determining whether an issue is a question of fact, a question of
law, or a mixed question of fact and law—an analysis that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court performs on a regular basis.142 If
the court concludes that the appellant’s unpreserved argument
implicates unresolved questions of fact, then the preservation
defect should not be excused and the merits should not be
considered.
However, if the issue is a purely legal question requiring no
additional facts, the matter should next be reviewed in light of
Krynicki’s third criterion. This criterion—requiring an issue that
is almost certain to arise again—permits the court to carefully
137. See Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291–92.
138. Id. at 292.
139. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1038.
140. Id. at 1037.
141. See State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1245–48 (R.I. 2013) (Flaherty, J.
and Indeglia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result).
142. See, e.g., Banville v. Brennan, 84 A.3d 424, 431 (R.I. 2014); Tedesco
v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920, 924–25 (R.I. 2005); Robitaille v. Brousseau, 339
A.2d 738, 741 (R.I. 1975).
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select only those unpreserved arguments that will save parties
confusion on the same issues in future cases.143 “[D]eclining to
reach [a] straight-forward legal issue will neither promote judicial
economy, nor aid the administration of the criminal justice
system.”144 Recall that the dissent in Moten emphasized the fact
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court (prior to Moten’s trial) had
“provided little guidance on the application of Crawford.”145 If the
unpreserved issue is likely to arise in future cases, the court
should exercise its discretion in favor of eliminating future
confusion.
The criticism of this criterion is that if “[t]here is every
likelihood that the issue will be raised properly in future cases . . .
the court will be able to rule on the issue without making an
exception to the general rule.”146 This criticism, of course, ignores
the harm done to the litigant in the pending appeal and assumes
that the trial counsel in the next case will properly raise the
argument without any further guidance from the appellate
court.147 The great benefit of this criterion is that it impliedly
143. Kyrnicki, 689 F.2d at 292; see also United States v. Golon, 511 F.2d
298, 301 (1st Cir. 1975) (“[W]e are loath to pass over a question, squarely
before us, which is almost certain to be presented in identical terms in other
cases.”).
144. Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292. In United States v. Patrick V., the First
Circuit, citing Krynicki, stressed that:
[B]ecause this legal question is likely to arise in other cases—all the
more likely because of the paucity of case law regarding federal
juvenile dispositions in general and restitution in particular—
declining to hear the issue will neither promote judicial economy nor
aid in the administration of the juvenile justice system.
359 F.3d 3, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292).
145. Moten, 64 A.3d at 1245 (Flaherty, J. and Indeglia, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in result). The dissent cited State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d
631, 642 (R.I. 2006) and State v. Harris, 871 A.2d 341, 345 n.12 (R.I. 2005) as
cases wherein the court had set aside for another day the task of clarifying
the contours of Crawford. Moten, 64 A.3d at 1245.
146. Martineau, supra note 3, at 1041.
147. For example, nine years before the Rhode Island Supreme Court
rejected the defendant’s unpreserved Confrontation Clause argument in
Moten, it did the same in State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1039–40 (R.I. 2004).
In Lynch, the defendant argued that the introduction of extrajudicial
statements made by a witness to a police officer violated the Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 1036. As in Moten, trial counsel in Lynch limited his objection
to the hearsay rules, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that
the Confrontation Clause argument was unpreserved. Id. at 1039. The court
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embodies the “novelty” standard without explicitly requiring it.
Reaching an unpreserved legal issue that has already been
addressed by the courts on previous occasions would neither
promote judicial economy nor aid the administration of the justice
system. Therefore, the court may continue to consider novelty,
but not be bound by it.
Far from a cure-all, Krynicki provides a modest clarification
for appellate advocates and judges alike.
Certainly, other
148
paradigms abound,
and therefore, Krynicki is not trumpeted as
the solution, but rather a solution—a humble alternative—to the
current “novel constitutional rule” regime.
IV. CONCLUSION

Simply put, the fact that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
justices in Moten spent twelve well-researched, well-written pages
debating the precise contours of an exception (that has existed for
nearly fifty years) to a rule (that has existed for twice that long)
tends to negate any claim that the doctrine faithfully serves
judicial economy. Hopefully, at this point of the Article, it is clear
that its intended purpose is neither to intentionally increase nor
decrease the overall amount of unpreserved issues considered by
the court. A stark increase, given Rhode Island’s limited appellate
resources, would seriously detriment the speedy administration of
justice in the state, while a stark decrease would frankly be
impossible given the few unpreserved arguments that the court
currently agrees to consider. The purpose of the Article is to
merely suggest a modest alternative to the current novel
constitutional rule exception. The purpose is to allow attorneys to
also rejected the defendant’s attempts to fit within the novel constitutional
rule exception because any error was harmless. Id. at 1040.
148. Connecticut appellate courts, for example, require the following
elements before agreeing to consider unpreserved arguments on appeal:
[W]e hold that a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are
met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a
fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly
exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if
subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to
demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation
beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823, 827 (Conn. 1989) (footnote omitted).
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spend less time considering whether to devote precious pages in
their appellate briefs (and minutes at oral argument) on an
unpreserved issue if the court does not intend to excuse the defect.
The actual raise or waive rule—requiring an objection be made at
trial to preserve the argument for appeal—is fairly simple to
understand and easy to apply; one hopes that, at some point, its
exception will follow suit.

